2024 Parliamentary Elections

Introduction and Brief Summary

The next parliamentary elections in Georgia will be held on October 26, 2024. For the first time in the country's history, the highest legislative body will be elected through a fully proportional electoral system. The 150 seats in the Parliament of Georgia will be allocated to political parties that receive at least 5% of valid votes cast by participating voters in the elections.

The 2024 parliamentary elections is seen as crucial for the country's democratic development and its integration into the European Union. One of the nine recommendations issued by the European Commission in the process of granting candidate status to Georgia is the holding of free, fair, and competitive parliamentary elections.^[1] Accordingly, the evaluation of the parliamentary elections will significantly determine Georgia's European integration process, which currently, according to the European Council conclusions, is de facto leading to be halted.^[2]

The main political unions consider the upcoming elections critical for the country's future. A significant part of them frame the October 26 elections as a referendum—the ruling party, Georgian Dream—Democratic Georgia, considers the elections a choice between war and peace, while the main opposition parties equate it to the choice between the country's democratic, European future and international isolation and/or falling under Russian influence.

The pre-election period officially started on August 27; however, prior developments have significantly affected the pre-election environment. Georgia faced the start of the pre-election campaign under conditions of high political polarization, which was preceded by the adoption of the re-introduced draft law "On Transparency of Foreign Influence" by the Parliament and overriding the presidential veto, regardless of continuous protests from the Georgian public and harsh criticism from the President of Georgia and Georgia's strategic partners. The adoption of the law was accompanied by an unprecedented campaign to discredit civil society, as well as attempts to intimidate government critics, threatening phone calls and even physical attacks. The messages against civil society were subsequently reflected in the ruling party’s pre-election campaign.

The ruling party’s anti-Western, including Eurosceptic messages, became prominent during the pre-election period. Added to this was the exploitation of the tragedy of the Ukrainian people at war for electoral purposes. Among the steps the government took to violate human rights and hinder the European integration process was the adoption of the law "On Family Values and Protection of Minors."

To participate in the elections, 18 political unions were registered with the Central Election Commission and submitted their party lists. All parties were able to conduct their pre-election campaigns to varying degrees. Once the pre-election events commenced, the ruling party leaders promised their supporters that they would declare the main opposition parties unconstitutional if they secured a constitutional majority in parliament.

Throughout the pre-election campaign, the ruling party held a significant advantage due to the administrative resources at its disposal. Several electorally motivated social, economic, and infrastructural programs and projects were initiated, and employees of budgetary organizations actively participated in the ruling party's campaign events. The pre-election environment was damaged by numerous instances of personal data collection/processing from voters and the alleged confiscation of citizens' identity cards, which represents an attempt to pressure voters and hinder their ability to express their will; as well as the failure of the relevant state agencies to investigate these cases. During the campaign, cases of physical violence, disruption of the election campaign, threats or/and intimidation, attempts to break into and damage party offices, arrests of individuals affiliated with political parties, and alleged voter bribery were recorded.

The parliamentary elections was preceded by a number of changes in the electoral legislation, which were, in most cases, implemented hastily and without the full participation of all involved parties. Among the implemented changes, it is worth mentioning the worsening of the rule for the Central Election Commission’s composition, whereby the quorum required for making decisions in the Central Election Commission was reduced from a qualified majority to a simple majority, the cancellation of gender quotas, and changes in the deadline for the allocation of functions among members of Precinct Election Commissions.^[3] Despite the recommendations of the Venice Commission, OSCE/ODIHR, and local observer organizations, the amendments stipulate that, instead of the President of Georgia, the Speaker of the Parliament selects and nominates candidates for the CEC Chairperson and professional members to the Parliament, which can then elect them from these candidates for a full term of 5 years by a simple majority. With the amendments, the position of that Deputy Chairperson of the CEC, who was elected from among the members of the CEC appointed by the opposition, was abolished. On April 30, 2024, the Parliament elected the CEC chairman and three members with a simple majority.

​​The media environment for the 2024 parliamentary elections was polarized. The National Communications Commission's decisions created the risks of using the commission as a punitive mechanism and instrumentalizing it in relation to critical media outlets.

In the lead-up to the elections, alongside domestic disinformation and information manipulation, Russian information operations in political processes became significantly active. The social media network linked to Russia, which in previous years primarily spread anti-Western messages - particularly narratives opposing Georgia's integration into the European Union - intensified its campaign to support the government during the pre-election period.

 

The full report is currently in the process of being translated into English. This page will be updated with the complete English-language version as soon as it becomes available.

 

 

^[1]  European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions. 8.11.2023. 2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy. pp. 25-26. Accessed June 23, 2024. https://bit.ly/3zg1NLO

^[2]  European Council, EUCO 15/24, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/qa3lblga/euco-conclusions-27062024-en.pdf

^[3] CEC Decree that Alters the Timelines for Casting Lots in Precinct Election Commissions is Inconsistent with the Law https://isfed.ge/geo/gantskhadebebi/tseskos-dadgenileba-romlitats-itsvleba-saubno-saarchevno-komisiebshi-tsiliskris-chatarebis-vadebi-kanontan-sheusabamoa